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NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Michael Black
1 Ross Terrill’s point of departure is the observation that China has remained, up to now,
a repressive empire devoid of any opposition. Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin,
and now Hu Jintao, each in their own way and in their own time, have adapted and
even modernised the forms of power of the thousand-year-old empire. To the author,
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has maintained an imperial concept of itself and
reinvented the thousand-year-old autocracy.
2 Ross Terrill is a political commentator, but also a historian; in his view, this enormous
state—the  only  one  of  its  kind  today—is  unsuited  to  the  modern  conditions  of
development and of unity in diversity, which are characteristic of the new century. The
regime,  which is  both imperial  and Leninist,  is  sticking rigidly to its  obession with
“stability” and “unity”: it rejects any political evolution and refuses all heterodoxy. The
author  does  not  believe  that  a  repressive state  which  is  opposed  to  progress  can
maintain itself for long, while the economy and society are evolving rapidly.
3 Three essential traits are said to characterise the Chinese state: it is led from the top; it
believes itself to be the possessor and defender of the truth; and it makes only tactical
compromises with internal and external realities. The problem is not China’s increasing
power, but that it is still governed by an imperial-Leninist dictatorship. Theoretically,
federalism  could  be  a  solution,  and  many  Chinese  thinkers  have  suggested  such  a
constitutional  structure.  But the centre imposes unity by force and stability by the
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refusal  to  countenance  any  opposition—albeit  regional—;  federalism,  moreover,  is
evidently not on the agenda.
4 Ross Terrill’s book is a reflection on Chinese history. Following a chronological plan,
the author’s reflections focus first of all on how the imperial state came into being in
Antiquity. In the first centuries of our era (during the Han and Tang dynasties) grew a
feeling of the superiority of Chinese civilisation. The Empire believed it had a mandate
to govern the Universe,  even if  the “barbarians” had to be “reined in” rather than
overcome. At the same time, pragmatism already often got the upper hand over official
doctrine, Confucianism or legism.
5 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the tragic decline of China illustrated the
search for  a  new political  order,  and,  in  the  main,  the  failure  of  such efforts.  The
coming of Mao Zedong was that of a “Red Emperor”, a name the author also applies to
Deng Xiaoping and to Jiang Zemin. The Party-state’s Number One, who is not elected by
the people, has conserved—although in a decreasing manner—the tributes, prejudices,
constraints and characteristics of the Sons of Heaven. The era of Deng and Jiang is
attempting a synthesis, which the author sees as impossible, between Leninism and the
market economy.
6 New questions arise in the context of the modern world. What is China? Where are its
frontiers, if it has any? What does being Chinese mean? Several chapters follow, which
focus on the relationships between the mainland and its maritime extensions—Taiwan,
Hong Kong, the Pacific; and Central Asia—Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia. These reflections
provide stimulating passages about Chinese foreign policy, “its aims and its imperial
ways of acting”.
7 Looking to the future, Ross Terrill lists the main challenges he believes China must face.
First of all, an ageing population: a quarter of Chinese will be over 65 in 2030. Relations
between civilian and military leaders may cause political problems. The health system
in  rural  areas  remains  highly  inadequate.  The  traditional  political  apathy  of  the
majority of Chinese can only favour an oligarchical regime. The problems of legitimacy
and of succession to power are not resolved by the compulsory adherence to the “four
cardinal principles” (the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, government
by the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism) which “are in practice the unofficial
Constitution of the PRC”. Scientific and technical creativity needs to be expanded. The
banking system needs to be overhauled. The environment still needs cleaning up. Some
items on this list are questionable, while other challenges could be added to it. Ross
Terrill foresees a collapse of the system rather than a gradual evolution. However, one
does not always see clearly, in his conclusion, what comes under geopolitical analysis
and what stems from the opinions of a militant democrat.
8 The book ends by conjuring up seven possible scenarios. The first is the continuity of
the present state of affairs. The second is of a weakening of the centre and of a certain
regional fragmentation. The third envisages a partial evolution towards a multiparty
system.  The  fourth  hypothesis  is  that  of  a  quiet  collapse  of  the  Communist  Party,
comparable to what happened in Moscow in 1991. The fifth hypothesis has the author
envisaging a split in the Party between Leninists and Social Democrats ; the People’s
Liberation  Army  (PLA)  intervenes  in  favour  of  the  former  and  then  goes  back  to
barracks. Two additional developments could take the place of this scenario : either the
PLA seizes power, or, on the contrary, it supports the Social Democrat wing and the
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system begins to move towards a postcommunist regime. Some will say this is excess of
imagination and total uncertainty. 
9 Ross Terrill has put all his talent into this remarkable book which is, nevertheless, a
work  which  expounds  a  thesis:  the  present  “imperial-Leninist”  Chinese  regime is
incompatible with the market economy and unsuited to the changes of the beginning of
the twenty-first  century.  It  is  likely to disappear in sudden collapse rather than by
gradual evolution.
10 All political regimes do indeed come to an end, and that of the Chinese Party-state will
meet  this  fate  sooner  or  later.  However,  certain  factors  do not  seem to  have been
sufficiently  taken into  account  by  the  author,  in  particular  the  size  of  the  Chinese
population. It is a pity that the book does not devote a chapter to demographic history,
which would shed essential  light.  The population of  China (22% of  humanity)  is  an
exceptional  and  historically  unprecedented  element.  Because  of  its  mass,  and  its
inequalities of development, it seems unlikely to us that China could evolve politically
according to the model of Taiwan, of South Korea or even of twentieth century Japan.
11 Moreover  one  can  disagree  with  some  of  the  author’s  other  beliefs.  The  postulate
according to which a Leninist regime is incompatible with a market economy is not
demonstrated. Politics often consists of circumventing incompatibilities, of reconciling
opposites and of finding compromises which a priori seemed impossible. The group of
practising engineers which governs in Peking is perhaps incapable of doing more than
managing the country in a period of seething and destabilising economic growth. But
would their possible replacements do any better?
12 Finally, the book adheres to a very monolithic vision of the present political system.
There is no room for the appearance of trends, whether reforming or conservative. It is
true that the obsession with “stability” and “unity” at the summit of the Party-state
keeps them at bay. But their underlying existence is also attested by this obsession. And
socio-economic evolution, the appearance of new social groups, as well as the relative
weakening of the central government, are fertile ground for their development.
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